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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BUDGET SYSTE.M, INC., 
Plaintiff and Res·pondent, 
vs. 
BUDGET LOAN AND 
FINANCE P·LAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 9224 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
The respondent on page 4 of its brief refers 
to a letter written by J. S. Monosson, at that time 
house counsel of Budget Finance Plan (the hold-
ing company of appellant) and addressed to the 
American Buyers Credit Company, who had pur-
chased the stock of Budget System, Inc. This letter 
was admitted in evidence as Exhibit P-11 (Tran-
script of Proceedings, page 46) and considered by 
the trial court over the objections of appellant 
(Tra11script of Proceedings, page 45) that such 
evidence was incompetent, immaterial and irrele-
vant. 
The appellant in this reply brief wishes to show 
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that such a letter should not have been admitted 
in evidenee and considered by the trial court in 
making its decision; that such evidence is inad-
missible and cannot be considered in this cause. 
STATE'MENT OF P'OINTS 
POINT I. 
OUT OF COURT ADMISSIONS BY AN ATTORNEY 
NOT DISPENSING WITH THE PROOF OR INFLUENC-
ING THE PROCEDURE IN THE CASE ARE INAD-
MISSIBLE UNLESS THE ATTORNEY HAD SOME 
SPECIAL AUTHORITY TO MAKE SUCH STATE-
MENTS. 
POINT II. 
AN ATTORNEY HAS NO IMPLIED CONSENT TO 
SURRENDER ANY SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF HIS 
CLIENT, OR IMP AIR OR DESTROY HIS CLIENT'S 
CAUSE OF ACTION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
OUT OF COURT ADMISSIONS BY AN ATTORNEY 
NOT DISPENSING WITH THE PROOF OR INFLUENC-
ING THE PROCEDURE IN THE CASE ARE INAD-
MISSIBLE UNLESS THE ATTORNEY HAD SOl\iE 
SPECIAL AUTHORITY TO MAKE SUCH STATE-
MENTS. 
Respondent on page 4 of its brief refers to 
Exhibit P-11 and quotes the words of Mr. Mon-
osson, house counsel for Budget Finance Plan, in 
his letter to the American Buyers Credit Company 
to the effect that appellant's organization had been 
unable to utilize the name used by its other offices 
by reason of the fact that the name "Budget Plan" 
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was pre-empted by Mr. Barker, the predecessor in 
Salt Lake City of the American Buyers Company. 
Respondent on page 11 of its brief states further 
that the above statement of Mr. Monosson coin-
cides with the decision reached by the trial court 
and therefore should conclude the matter. In other 
words, respondent and the trial court are holding 
the appellant for the statement of its house coun-
sel which was an out of court admission by an 
attorney and not made for the specific judicial pur-
pose of dispensing with the proof or for influencing 
the procedure in the actual case. 
It will be noted that the American Buyers 
Company, to whom· the letter (Exhibit P-11) was 
addressed, is not the plaintiff in this action and 
was nothing more nor less than the purchaser of 
the common stock of the plaintiff. Mr. Monosson 
apparently was not acquainted with all of the facts 
in this case as in his letter he refers to the pre-
decessors of American Buyers Company. The plain-
tiff and respondent is the successor to Mr. Barker 
and not the American Buyers Company. In this 
case there is no question that a letter to a stock-
holder should not be admissible. Although he was 
secretary of the company, his letter was in capacity 
as counsel. 
The courts have uniformly held that an attorney 
employed without reference to pending litigation 
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is but an agent, and his a:uthority to bind his prin-
cipal by his ad1nissions is not affected by the fact 
that he is an attorney at law, except insofar as that 
fact may reflect upon the apparent scope of the 
agency. Brown v. Hebb (Md. 1934) 175 A. 602. 
Carroll v. Pratt (Minn. 1956) 76 NW2d 69'3 
is a key case in this area of the law holding that 
the attorney-client relationship does not of itself 
supply the attorney with authority to make extra 
judicial admissions on behalf of his client, and the 
attorney's authority to make such statements is 
measured by the same tests of express or implied 
authority as are applied to other agents. In that 
case the defendant's attorney, in an out of court 
admission, said that he had investigated the ditch 
in controversy and l1ad found that the defendant 
had not completed his work in respect to the ditch 
and that he would try and get the defendant to 
finish the work. The court held that the defendant 
was not bound by this statement of his attorney and 
they laid down the following rule of law: Out of 
court admissions of fact by an attorney, whether 
written or oral, whicl1 have not been made for the 
specific judicial purpose of dispensing with the 
proof or for influencing the procedure in the case 
are inadmissible in evidence against his client, unless 
it appears that aside from his mere employment in 
connection with pending or prospective litigation 
the attorney had some special authority. 
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Another expression of the basic principle is 
the rule in Jackson v. Schine Lexington Corp. (Ken-
tucky 1947) 205 SW2d 1013. There the court held 
that an attorney has no power to prejudice his client 
by admissions of fact made out of court, because an 
agency such as the attorney-client relationship does 
not carry the implication of authority to make bind-
ing admissions other than in the general manage-
nlent of the litigation. The court also laid down the 
principle that a written admission has no more 
efficacy than an oral one. McGary v. McGary (Pa. 
1898) 43 W.N.C. 268, held that it was proper to 
exclude from evidence a letter written by the de-
fendant's attorney to one having the custody of 
the deed, wl1erein language was used inconsistent 
with the contention of the client that the deed had 
been delivered to her. In other words, these cases 
hold that written admissions of fact made by an 
attorney out of court cannot be used against his 
client unless they were made for the specific pur-
pose of dispensing witl1 proof or influencing the pro-
cedure in a cause, or unless it appears that the 
attorney had some special authority to act for his 
client out of court and that the admissions were 
properly related thereto. 
It is the policy of the law to encourage inter-
changes between parties to a pending or prospective 
litigation in the hope that they will solve their prob-
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lems out of court. If every out of court statement by 
an attorney was admissible in evidence an attorney 
would be afraid to make any opinion or admission, 
and as a result parties to a pending or prospective 
litigation would seldom, if ever, be able to reach a 
compromise, nor would there be any cooperation 
between the parties to speed up the judicial process. 
Coirre v. Arrow Exterminating Co. (N.Y.1951) 
108 N.Y. Supp. 603, held that a statement inconsis-
tent with plaintiff's testimony by plaintiff's counsel 
to the defendants was hearsay, and to treat the 
statement as binding would be against public policy 
because such a ruling would virtually do away with 
the frien'dly interchange of views between opposing 
counsel. 
It is evident from the above cases, which are. 
the great weight of authority, that the attorney-
client relationship does not of itself supply the at-
torney with authority to make extra judicial admis-
sions. The only exceptions are : 
1. Admissions dispensing with the proof 
in the case or influencing the procedure in 
the case. 
2. Admissions in the general manage-
ment of the litigation. 
3. Where the attorney has special auth-
ority to make such admissions. 
The written statement of Mr. Monosson in his 
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letter to the American Buyers Company was merely 
his opinion as to the state of the name "Budget" 
and was not made to dispense with proof or influence 
the procedure in any pending or prospective litiga-
tion, nor was the admission made in the general 
management of any litigation. Mr. Monosson's posi-
tion was one of giving advice and opinions on mat-
ters affecting his company, but this does not mean 
that every opinion and bit of advice that he renders 
binds his company and can be used by an adversary 
in some future proceeding. To so hold would be to 
severely curtail the usefulness and purpose of a house 
counsel, for he would be afraid to make any state-
ment for fear that something he might say would 
prove detrimental to his client in future litigation. 
The policy of the law is to encourage interchange 
bet¥Jeen adverse and potentially adverse parties in 
the hope that an out of court settlement can be made. 
POINT II. 
AN ATTORNEY HAS NO IMPLIED C10NSENT TO 
8URRENDER ANY SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF HIS 
CLIENT, OR IMP AIR OR DESTROY HIS CLIENT'S 
CAUSE OF ACTION. 
It is also the contention of appellant that Mr. 
Monosson had no express or i1nplied authority to 
write in a letter a statement which in the future 
had the possibility of impairing or destroying a 
right or cause of action of his client, and therefore 
Exl1ibit P-11 should not have been adn1itted in evi-
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dence by the trial court. The following case law 
bears this outo 
The California District Court of Appeal in Bice 
v. Stevens (Cal. 1958) 325 P2d 244, laid down the 
following rule of law when it said on page 251 of 
the opinion: "The law does not favor snap judg-
ment. The policy of the law is to have every litigated 
case trie'd on its merits; and it looks with disfavor 
upon a party who regardless of the merits of the 
case attempts to take advantage of the mistake, 
surprise, inadvertence, or neglect of his adversary 
... " In that case the court held that a client was 
not bound when his attorney dismissed one of the 
defendants "with prejudice" by mistake and without 
his client's consent. 
The Utah Supreme Court has given credence 
to this line of reasoning by way of dicta in Rackham 
v. R~ackham (Utah 1951) 2'30 P2d 566, when it 
said: "* * * an attorney has no authority to enter 
into a stipulation relative to the substantial rights 
of his client without his client's consent * * *" In 
the case of Gagnon Company v. Nevada Desert Inn 
(Calif. Sup. Ct. 1955) 289 P2d 466, the court held 
that the conduct and management of the action is 
entrusted to the judgment of plaintiff's attorney, 
who decides what should be contested and what point 
should be taken or abandoned, in absence of special 
instructions by the client, but he ordinarily does 
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not have implied authority to do an act which will 
effect surrender or loss of his client's substantial 
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CONCLUSION 
The appellant therefore contends that Exhibit 
P-11 should not have been admitted into evidence, 
because the courts uniformly hold that out of court 
admissions by an attorney which do not dispense 
with the proof or influence the procedure or man-
agement of the litigation are inadmissible unless 
the attorney had some special authority. This is 
the case here as has heretofore been shown. Also 
an attorney may not surrender any substantial right 
of his client or impair, compromise, or destroy his 
client's cause of action as plaintiff claims was done 
by Mr. Monosson jn this case by his letter. Lastly, 
public policy decries holding appellant's attorney 
for something he might have said prior to the liti-
gation. 
WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully submits 
that Exhibit P-11 was improperly offered by re-
spondent and improperly admitted by the trial court 
and therefore should not be considered by this Hon-
orable Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOUIS H. CALLISTER and 
NATHAN J. FULLMER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
619 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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